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KEEPING LEGAL HISTORY MEANINGFUL 
Richard H. Pi/des' 
A Response to Charles A. Heckman's 
"Keeping Legal History 'Legal' and Judicial Activism in 
Perspective: A Reply to Richard Pildes" 
The end of Reconstruction is conventionally identified as 
the 1876 disputed Presidential election and subsequent with-
drawal of federal troops from the South. Yet for nearly a genera-
tion after that date, black Americans' political participation re-
mained surprisingly robust. Even in the 1890s, half of black men 
continued to vote in key gubernatorial races in Southern states. 
More remarkably still, inter-racial fusion coalitions controlled 
the state legislature in the border state of North Carolina as late 
as 1898 (similar coalitions endured just as late in parts of Texas). 
Contrary to deterministic views of the history of race in late 19th 
century America, the structure of the 20th century Southern ra-
cial order-segregation and the virtual elimination of black citi-
zens from democracy-was not locked into place by some essen-
tial, fixed, organic structure of "the white South" the moment 
federal troops withdrew. Far from monolithic and unified, white 
southerners were vehemently, even violently, fractured; the in-
terests and passions they pressed on post-Reconstruction state 
politics expressed dramatically opposed visions for government. 
The contest over black disfranchisement-and it was a contest-
was inextricably bound up with this death-struggle between con-
tending white factions: oligarchic, large, land-holding elites ver-
sus poorer, populist whites from outside the former plantation 
regions who had long resisted, but with sporadic success, the po-
litical domination of the oligarchs. Black votes threatened to tip 
this balance of power. 
A generation after the turbulence of this era, though, the 
comprehensive regime of white supremacy had emerged. So, 
1. Professor of Law, New York University. Thanks to Larry Kramer for com-
ments. Thanks also to Gretchen Feltes, for excellent library assistance, as always. 
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too, had one party political monopolization of Southern politics, 
in the form of the Democratic Party. Blacks had been eliminated 
from politics and socially segregated. Because this regime en-
dured until the modern civil rights era, it is easy to think its reign 
natural and inevitable. But this regime emerged through the 
struggles of this era; it had to be self-consciously constructed, 
brick by brick, year by year, in conflicts with opposing white fac-
tions close to equipoise, in battles whose outcome was often in 
doubt. At critical junctures, the triumph of one set of forces 
would send politics and culture down a particular path, a path 
that would then make the next step easier for those forces. 
Contrary, also, to the limited attention these issues have re-
ceived in modern constitutional scholarship, the forms of law 
played a central role in crystallizing the fluid, open-ended welter 
of events into a particular form. First, law was an instrument the 
oligarchs used to leverage fragile control at one moment into 
more persistent form; through laws that gerrymandered election 
districts, and through statutory suffrage restrictions, this faction 
undermined its political competition in incremental stages. 
These efforts then culminated in the new disfranchising constitu-
tions and constitutional amendments of 1890-1908 that, in the 
most enduring legal form available, froze into place an electorate 
drained of nearly all black, and many poor white, voters. Second, 
desperate black citizens, viewing the federal courts as their last 
hope, created and arranged financing for a social and litigation 
movement to challenge constitutionally these disfranchising con-
stitutions. But in Giles v. Harris/ a divided Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Holmes, resoundingly slammed the door on this last 
possible avenue of challenge. The uncertain, shifting, sharply 
contested possibilities that had characterized racial issues in the 
South on the eve of disfranchisement were now definitively 
closed. The white, reactionary, ruling elite, in the form of the 
one-party Democratic South, was in the saddle, and no national 
institution was prepared to do anything-rhetorically, culturally, 
politically, or legally-about it. Given that neither the President 
nor Congress was willing by this time to take any initiative in de-
fending the Fifteenth Amendment, itself the capstone of Recon-
struction, Giles might well be said to mark the final moment in 
the demise of Reconstruction. 
2. 189 u.s. 475 (1903). 
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These are the critical points in Democracy, Anti-
Democracy, and the Canon. 3 Professor Heckman's warm words 
for the quality of the historical work underlying those claims are 
much appreciated. But while he apparently accepts this broader 
historical analysis, Professor Heckman writes to argue that we 
should locate the Supreme Court's abnegation not in Giles, but 
in Mills v. Green,4 eight years earlier. Perhaps one should not 
worry much about whether the Supreme Court's acceptance of 
disfranchisement, the subject of little scholarly analysis until 
now, is better identified with Mills or Giles. The aims of The 
Canon, after all, were to explore the relationship of law to cul-
ture and politics, to expose the Supreme Court's role in the na-
tional toleration of disfranchisement, and to bring issues of de-
mocracy-and the destruction of democracy through law-closer 
to the center of constitutional thought. The specific case that 
best illuminates these themes is, perhaps, of less significance 
than that the themes be illuminated. Nonetheless, I must insist 
that Professor Heckman has focused on the individual legal 
notes in Giles while failing to hear the melody being played. In 
his fixation on the most technical aspects of the Giles litigation, 
Professor Heckman has missed the political, cultural, historical, 
and legal significance of Giles as a defining moment. 
I 
Giles was not, of course, the first case in which courts of this 
era concluded that equity would not enforce "political rights." 
Professor Heckman seems to think that Giles could be of sub-
stantive significance only if it had newly conceived this doctrine. 
That is akin to arguing that Plessy v. Ferguson5 was not all that 
noteworthy because the Court, having already held that interra-
cial adultery could be punished more severly than same-race 
adultery, had already established that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not require colorblindness.6 Giles was significant be-
cause it was prepared to hold political rights non-remediable in 
equity even in a context that presented the most radical threat to 
the constitutional order that the Court had faced under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. And Giles was momentous because the de-
3. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const. 
Comm. 295 (2000). 
4. 159 U.S. 651 (1895). 
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
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cisive actors of the time understood it in these terms, as a fun-
damental constitutional test of whether massive disfranchise-
ment would be permitted under the shadow of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Most dramatically, the language in which the 
Court, through Justice Holmes, justified applying the doctrine, 
even in such an extreme context, baldly proclaimed that the 
Court would not entertain head-on challenges to disfranchise-
ment in any form of action-equitable, legal, or any other.7 
Giles' lawyer framed the issue in the broad, test-case terms 
in which blacks who were active in the litigation, supported it, 
and were watching it, understood the stakes: "a more high-
handed and flagrant case of the nullification of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and repudiation of their solemn guarantees to the negroes 
of America can never be presented to the courts of the coun-
try."8 Giles' brief concluded in ways that could hardly have 
framed the confrontation more momentously: "And this court 
must know that the honor of this nation is bound to suffer in the 
estimation of the world if its solemn constitutional guarantees 
made to the negro shortly after the late civil war, when his con-
spicuous service on behalf of the Union was fresh in the minds of 
the American people, are allowed to go unenforced, and to be-
come a dead letter in a well-established case like this. "9 To dis-
pute that the stakes were high would be foolhardy, given that the 
new Alabama Constitution of 1901 contained, as later historians 
have remarked, "the most elaborate suffrage requirements that 
have ever been in force in the United States."10 Moreover, Jack-
son Giles was hardly an idiosyncratic, well-to-do plaintiff off on 
a solitary litigation lark. Giles, a janitor in the federal courthouse 
in Montgomery, Alabama, was president of an Alabama organi-
zation called the Colored Men's Suffrage Association. More 
work needs to be done on the history of this intriguing organiza-
tion, but it appears that this was the central organizational vehi-
7. The Court formally left open the possibility of a damages action, but no court 
ever acted on that option. 
8. Brief for Appellant in Giles v. Harris, No. 493, at 4 (October Term, 1902). 
9. Id. at 16. Earlier, the brief had further framed the issue, not in the narrow pro-
cedural terms Professor Heckman sees, but in the broad terms that the case was obvi· 
ously meant to raise: "To the negro, if the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments are stricken from under him, under the pretense of the want of jurisdiction 
in the courts of the United States to enforce them, he has only one other guarantee be-
tween him and actual slavery: that is the one contained in the thirteenth amendment. 
What reason would he have to hope for protection under that one, should the Southern 
States by similar methods undertake to deprive him of that guarantee?" ld. at 7. 
10. See Pildes, 17 Canst. Comm. at (cited in note 3). 
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de blacks created in Alabama to challenge disfranchisement. 
Giles brought his action on behalf of 5,000 similarly situated 
"negro citizens" of Montgomery County. His lawyer, Wilford H. 
Smith of New York City, was the personal lawyer and friend of 
Booker T. Washington. Smith had come to Alabama at Wash-
ington's urging to handle the case, and Washington had secretly 
raised the funds to support the litigation- indeed, so concerned 
was Washington that he was risking his public reputation that he 
wrote his correspondence about the litigation in code. To avoid 
the defects of previous litigation, Smith pulled together exten-
sive newspaper reports chronicling the comparative numbers of 
blacks and whites disfranchised in different counties of Alabama 
by the new constitution.11 Similar suits were filed in Louisiana 
and Virginia, which appear to have awaited the result in Giles. 12 
The financial, organizational, personal, and emotional resources 
the black community invested in Giles were substantial- and 
these were scarce resources that could not be marshalled time 
and time again in communities where public defiance frequently 
met economic or more violent forms of intimidation. Professor 
Heckman's focus on the bare legal text of Giles fails to appreci-
ate the unique effort mobilized to press the litigation, that the 
litigation was at one and the same time one of the only cards, as 
well as the last card, the activist black community had to play to 
challenge disfranchisement in the national political arena. 
Alabama's lawyer also urged the Court to confront disfran-
chisement head-on, instead of framing the case in narrow proce-
dural or technical terms. He forthrightly admitted that the Ala-
bama Constitution of 1901 employed tests that would exclude 
"many whites" as well as "the mass of the negro population" 
from the vote. 13 Alabama's lead argument, and most of its brief, 
was devoted to the fundamental, substantive constitutional mer-
its. Thus, the state urged that the purposes of the constitution's 
drafters was irrelevant; that the constitution on its face did not 
single out negroes for disfranchisement; that if the constitution 
were administered in a discriminatory way, that was a defect that 
could not be traced to the constitution itself and hence could not 
be remedied by attacking the constitution itself; and that Ala-
11. J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undo-
ing of the Second Reconstruction 322 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
12. My collaborator, Professor Rebecca J. Scott, has done research which suggests 
that Louisiana officials put the challenge to disfranchisement on hold there, and then 
after Giles pressed the courts to resolve it, after the state brought forward arguments 
based on Giles itself as to why the case should be dismissed. 
13. Brief for Appellee in Giles v. Harris, No. 493 at 8 (1902). 
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bama had the obvious right to exclude those who could not meet 
the "good character" and "understanding" tests. Alabama 
pressed the Court to address these underlying substantive issues: 
"It is important, for obvious reasons, that the latter question [the 
substantive merits of whether disfranchisement was constitu-
tional], if possible, be authoritatively settled .... "14 Both sides, 
therefore, framed the case as the culminating act in the disfran-
chisement saga. 
The Court, too, took on the challenge in these terms. 
Holmes recognized that the stakes went well beyond doctrinal 
principles previously established. Thus, Holmes nodded toward 
the "traditional limits" that precluded proceedings in equity to 
remedy political wrongs. 15 But he hardly considered that a suffi-
cient answer, given the magnitude of the issues involved. For 
immediately after restating this traditional principle, Holmes 
went on to explain why that principle was put in issue by the 
massive, constitutional disfranchisement of which Giles com-
plained in his proto-class action: "But we cannot forget that we 
are dealing with a new and extraordinary situation, and we are 
unwilling to stop short of the final considerations which seem to 
the United States to dispose of the case."16 The precise point of 
Giles's argument was that traditional equitable restraints on 
remedying deprivations of political rights should not preclude 
relief when a state engaged in a conspiracy to nullify the Recon-
struction Amendments-in as "high-handed and flagrant" a 
manner as imaginable. As Giles' lawyer put it, while money 
damages might adequately remedy routine voting-rights viola-
tions, it would be "absurd" to think such an award, "however 
large," could be adequate when massive, race-based, constitu-
tional disfranchisement was involved.17 Justice Harlan, in dis-
sent, similarly went out of his way to observe that "the case in-
volves questions of considerable importance .... "18 Given this 
context, it is rather an understatement, at the least, to describe 
Giles as a case "basically concerned with procedural issues of no 
lasting consequence. "19 
14. Id. at 2. 
15. 189 U.S. at 486 (citing Green v Mills). 
16. 189 U.S. at 486. 
17. Giles Brief at 7. 
18. 189 U.S. at 494. 
19. Charles A. Heckman, Keeping Legal History "Legal" and Judicial Activism in 
Perspective: A Reply to Richard Pi/des, 19 Const. Comm. 637 (2002). 
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Holmes, not seeing things the way Professor Heckman does 
today, went on to address the "final considerations" that he as-
serted had to be confronted to deal properly with the "new and 
extraordinary situation" Giles in fact presented. Fully appreciat-
ing the context of Giles, Holmes addressed those "final consid-
erations" with justifications themselves so final in character as to 
still, more than 100 years later, take a reader's breath away: 
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population 
intends to keep the blacks from voting. To meet such an in-
tent something more than ordering the plaintiff's name to be 
inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. If the conspir-
acy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not 
defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting 
in that State by officers of the court, it seems to us that all the 
plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form. Apart 
from damages to the individual, relief from a great political 
wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the 
State itself, must be given them by the legislative and political 
department of the Government of the United States. Decree 
affirmed. 20 
If this is not a death-knell to any effort to persuade federal 
courts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against massive, ra-
cialized disfranchisement, it is hard to know what would be. 
Newspaper editorials and academic commentators of the time 
certainly took Giles as exactly that. The Canon noted, for exam-
ple, that the New York Daily Tribune desperately cried out: 
"Somewhere, somehow, there must be a way of passing on the 
constitutionality of State laws which plainly nullify the spirit of 
the federal Constitution .... "21 But as the plaintive tone of the 
editorial suggested, Holmes had made clear there was no such 
way. 
Academic commentary in the American Political Science 
Review construed Giles as providing "the real explanation of the 
difficulty in the way of those who seek through the courts to 
compel the dominant race in a great section of the country to do 
that which that race is almost unanimously determined it will not 
do. "22 In the legal scholarship of the era, a Harvard Law Review 
article, after noting the Mills case, nonetheless went on to re-
mark that "[b ]y far the most significant recent case is that of 
20. 189 U.S. at 488. 
21. Pildes, 17 Const. Comm. at 312 (cited in note 3). 
22. John C. Rose, Negro Suffrage: The Constitwiona/ Point of View, I Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rcv.l7,39(1906). 
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Giles v. Harris . .. [which reveals that] equity considers her ma-
chinery too lame and impotent to attempt such a gigantic task as 
preventing the people of a state from so administering a law, fair 
upon its face, as to effect a fraudulent discrimination on account 
of race."23 Similarly, a Columbia Law Review article "admitted" 
that Giles and a follow-up case, Giles v. Teasley/4 "have made it 
quite difficult to bring the question [of whether the disfranchis-
ing constitutions violated the Fifteenth Amendment] squarely 
before the Supreme Court .... "25 None of these articles sug-
gested that Mills offered any comparable obstacle. If any actor 
of the time saw Giles as "basically concerned with procedural is-
sues of no lasting consequence," I have not run across that fig-
ure. Nor does Professor Heckman offer any such evidence from 
a single figure of the period; Professor Heckman focuses only on 
the formal texts of the opinion, rather than on the political and 
social context in which those decisions took on meaning. 
To black activists seeking to stave off the elimination of 
black political participation, Giles must have been devastating. 
In many states, federal court litigation had been looked to for 
several years as the last, best chance to defeat disfranchise-
ment-especially within the black community. Whites who also 
resisted disfranchisement often encouraged blacks to stay out of 
the political phase of the struggle over disfranchisement; the fear 
was that black participation would countermobilize more aggres-
sive white support. In North Carolina, for example, Republican 
Party leaders, though fighting disfranchisement, dissuaded black 
leaders from mobilizing opposition during the 1900 campaign for 
popular approval of the constitutional disfranchising amend-
ments.26 These leaders expressly held out as their last hope that, 
if the amendments were adopted, the courts would find the pro-
visions unconstitutional (note that this hope remained alive long 
after Mills v. Green had been decided). Given that federal courts 
were held out as the alternative to political struggle, even as late 
as 1900, one can only imagine the despair that Giles must have 
engendered in the black community. 
23. Julien C. Monnet, The Latest Phase of Negro Disfranchisement, 26 Harv. L. 
Rev. 42, 53,54 (1912-13). 
24. 193 u.s. 146 (1904). 
25. See also William C. Coleman, The Fifteenth Amendment, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 
416, 448 n.73 (1910). The quotation goes on to say: "but it is thoroughly believed that 
court ... will, if necessary, make every endeavor to meet the question squarely, even to 
the extent of modifying or over-ruling a former decision." 
26. Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Gender & Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of 
White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 at 123 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
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II 
Why does Professor Heckman assert that, despite all this, 
Giles was of no real moment? Primarily, it seems, because Giles 
arose in what he calls a "complicated procedural posture." Pro-
fessor Heckman then focuses only on these procedural and tech-
nical issues of jurisdiction and pleading. Professor Heckman ex-
presses disagreement or puzzlement at how the Court handled 
these procedural questions. But this mystery is easy to unravel 
by keeping an eye on the larger prize. The Court brushed aside 
each procedural claim, sometimes with tortured logic, precisely 
so that the Court could issue a definitive ruling on the critical 
substantive question on which everything turned: that there 
would be no injunctive relief to protect political rights even 
when massive, racialized, constitutional disfranchisement was at 
stake. If the Court had merely addressed preliminary procedural 
issues, so that the challenge to disfranchisement was left alive 
and only postponed to another day, that would have been a dif-
ferent matter. But the key to the actual significance of Giles is in 
the Court's statement that the essential context is that "the great 
mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from 
voting," and the Court's response that, in such a context, any or-
der from the courts would be "an empty form." That is not a 
statement about procedural niceties; it is a stark notice that the 
end of the line has been reached. The Canon was not inattentive 
to the procedural issues;27 but these issues have nothing to do 
with the political, legal, social, or historical significance of Giles. 
27. Pildes, 17 Canst. Comm. at 305 n.44 (cited in note 3). I do accept one of Profes-
sor Heckman's technical points. I wrote that Holmes found that the complaint did allege 
the requisite amount in controversy. Formally speaking, as Professor Heckman points 
out, Holmes seems to have treated as a mere technicality a proper allegation of the juris-
dictional amount either because no objection had been raised on this ground, or because 
the complaint could easily be amended, on a remand, to meet this requirement, given 
that it was well established that deprivations of the right to vote for one individual could 
exceed the then-jurisdictional amount of $2,000. 
On the other hand, I am not sure what point Professor Heckman means to make in 
referring at length to the dissenting opinions. Justice Harlan did conclude that, if he 
reached the merits, he would permit the Giles litigation to go to trial, as did Justice 
Brewer. But Justice Harlan urged the Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It is hardly 
uncommon, of course, for Justices on the losing side of what Justice Harlan rightly called 
"questions of considerable importance" to urge the Court to dispose of the case on pro· 
cedural grounds, so that the battle might be faced another, perhaps more favorable, day. 
By urging that the case be allowed to go to trial, and that the issue of proper remedy be 
left for another day, Justice Brewer too might be thought to have been temporizing. I 
gather Professor Heckman wants to read these dissents as rejecting Giles' claims for eq· 
uitable relief, and hence agreeing with the Court majority on the critical issue, but the 
dissents do not say that and can hardly be taken to imply that. Had Justice Harlan or 
others in dissent agreed with the Court's holding on the unavailability of equitable relief 
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A second reason Professor Heckman thinks Giles unimpor-
tant is his view that Mills v. Green had already done all the dirty 
work. He bases his view not on anything said in the United 
States Supreme Court, but on the three-judge panel decision in 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case titled Green v. Mills.28 
The context was a challenge to South Carolina's registration 
scheme for a referendum on whether to call a constitutional con-
vention. But the claim was not a race-based challenge under the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments and the plaintiff was not 
identified in the pleadings as either white or black; as the Circuit 
Court expressly noted, "No discrimination on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude is charged, or pointed 
out as deducible on the face of the acts in question. "29 Even this 
lower-court decision, in fact, seems to go out of its way to qualify 
the decision and signal that this was not a case that tested the 
massive, racialized disfranchisement in state constitutions that to 
this point, had only been accomplished in Mississippi.30 The Cir-
cuit Court opinion rejecting the plaintiff's claims, written by Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Fuller sitting as circuit justice, did 
hold that equitable relief was not available to enforce political 
rights. Given that the context was so far removed from Giles, as 
the plaintiff and lower court framed the issue, it would surely be 
hard to see this decision, even had the Supreme Court upheld 
the decision, as the burial ceremony for a head-on confrontation 
with racialized, massive disfranchisement. But, as noted above, 
when Green v. Mills reached the Supreme Court, it was decided 
on entirely different grounds: the Court merely dismissed the 
case as moot in a brief, unanimous opinion. Given that the lower 
court made clear it was not addressing a race-based challenge 
under the Reconstruction Amendments, and that the Supreme 
Court completely bypassed the lower court's substantive holding 
in the case, it would have been easy enough to say so directly. 
28. 69 F. 852 (1895). 
29. Id. at 859. 
30. Consider the long qualification to the decision in the concurring opinion: 
There is nothing in the record to show that the complainant is a man of color, 
or that those for whom he sues are colored persons. The bill contains no allega-
tion that the provisions of law complained of were devised against the c~m­
plainant, or those for whom he sues, on account of their race, col~r, or prevu~us 
condition of servitude. There is nothing in the averments of the bill from which 
it may naturally, or must necessarily, be inferred that the complainant, a~d 
those for whom he sues, are citizens of color. There are no averments in the bill 
which show that the case falls within the purview of the fifteenth amendment of 
the constitution of the United States. Nor does the bill contain any allegations 
which raise a federal question under [the equal protection clause.]. 
Id. at 862 (Hughes, J., concurring). 
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about voting-rights remedies in favor of a unanimous mootness 
decision, a reader (at the time or today) might be forgiven for 
concluding that the Court was leaving itself options about how to 
respond to massive disfranchisement, should that tactic be 
adopted beyond Mississippi and a case directly presenting the 
issues come to the Court. But one need not go that far to wonder 
how Professor Heckman can conclude that the Court of Appeals 
decision in Mills effectively barred the way for litigation chal-
lenges to the disfranchisement that spread throughout the South 
in the late 1890s. 
Moreover, when, in the 1960s, the federal courts eventually 
began to dismantle the disfranchisement system created by the 
Alabama Constitution of 1901, they called Giles "the most for-
midable" obstacle they faced in asserting authority to order 
black voters registered.31 They called the principle that equity 
could not remedy political wrongs Justice Holmes's "somewhat 
celebrated dictum" in Giles v. Harris.32 They did not mention 
Mills v. Green. When the Court also refused for many years to 
stay out of one of the other major challenges to the design of 
democratic institutions, the problem of overwhelming malappor-
tionment, it was Giles v. Harris that Justices Frankfurter and 
Black debated in arguing about whether such challenges should 
be non-justiciable.33 Mills v. Green was nowhere to be seen. 
Even at the time, Southern disfranchisers did not seem to 
take Mills v. Green as the open license Professor Heckman con-
siders it. Long after Mills, Southern disfranchising conventions 
worried expressely about whether their work would survive chal-
lenge under the Reconstruction Amendments; suffrage provi-
sions were self-consciously crafted to minimize the risk, per-
ceived as real, that the federal courts would invalidate them. 
There is one decision, which postdates Mills by three years, that, 
unlike Mills, might be thought to have a plausible claim to being 
as significant as Giles; that is the decision in Williams v. Missis-
sippi.34 But even after Williams, Southern disfranchisers contin-
ued to worry about the federal courts and shaped their actions so 
as to minimize the risk of federal judicial reaction. They worried 
31. State of Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir. 1962). 
32. ld. 
33. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., an-
nouncing the judgment of the Court) (plurality opinion) (invoking Giles to conclude that 
claims of political right were not justiciable) with id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing Giles v. Harris). 
34. 170 U.S. 213 (1898), discussed in Pildes, 17 Const. Comm. at 298 n.l2 (cited in 
note 3). 
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that Williams, which involved the first challenge to disfranchise-
ment, had failed only because the plaintiff had not been able to 
prove adequately the racially discriminatory practices he al-
leged.35 We should not forget that even in 1903, three Justices 
were prepared to let the Giles case go to trial.36 The critical ac-
tors of the era acted as if Mills had wrought no drastic change. 
After Giles, however, no one could have missed the message-
and no one did. 
Finally, Professor Heckman takes issue with the sociopoliti-
cal question of whether a different outcome in Giles could plau-
sibly have influenced the political dynamics in a way that would 
have affected the outcome of disfranchisement struggles. In The 
Canon, I sought to document how recent and fragile the white 
electoral majorities were that approved disfranchisement in a 
border state like North Carolina, and how even in the deepest 
South, the disfranchising constitution of Alabama was adopted 
by a thin, nominal majority itself made possible only by over-
whelming fraud. The point was to suggest that the final and ulti-
mate entrenchment of disfranchisement, far from being the in-
evitable product of Southern majoritarianism, took form only by 
the narrowest of margins, if in fact popularly endorsed at all. Yet 
once the Southern electorate had been drastically constricted 
through these new constitutional provisions, these narrow elec-
toral (or fabricated electoral) margins were leveraged into essen-
tially unchallengeable and long-enduring political power. 
Once the reality of a precarious, contested, factional strug-
gle for control over the future of Southern politics even among 
whites is recognized, we can question Holmes's imagery of a ro-
35. Kousser, Colorblind Injustice at 322 (cited in note 11). In this respect, Kousser, 
writing many years later, disagrees with Vann Woodward, who does see Williams v. Mis-
sissippi as having been of greater significance at the time. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of 
the New South, 1877-19/3 at 322 (Louisiana State U. Press, 1951). 
36. Professor Heckman argues that had Giles come out differently, the case would 
have been a footnote even in my canon, as the consequence would have been "merely" 
to send the case to trial. This is much like saying had the Supreme Court held the consti-
tutionality of the Vietnam War a justiciable question, such a decision would "merely" 
have sent the case to trial. Well, yes. But the significance of sending Giles to trial would 
be far greater than even this Vietnam War claim; the latter posed complex constitutional 
questions on the merits. Yet there was no great factual mystery as to what states like 
Alabama were doing with disfranchisement; the decisive question was whether federal 
courts had the power to provide a remedy. Had the Court required that the case proceed 
to trial, the trial outcome might have been relatively foreordained; much would have de-
pended, of course, on the exact terms of any such Court decision. I would hope it is clear 
that when I refer to a countrary decision, in which the Court would have "upheld" Giles's 
claims, I am referring to the underlying, substantive issues in the Giles litigation, not the 
preliminary procedural issues on which Professor Heckman focuses. 
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mantic, but tragic Supreme Court staying its hand only because 
faced with an insurmountable, unified white South. As the great 
Southern historian C. Vann Woodward revealed long ago, "Be-
hind the 'White Supremacy' slogans and the front of racial soli-
darity, there raged a struggle between Southern white men that 
is usually overlooked. "37 Had the federal courts invalidated the 
1901 Alabama Constitution (whether that decision was actively 
enforced or not), who knows what configuration Alabama's poli-
tics would have taken, in this always turbulent era, at the next 
moment at which the issue might have been pressed? At decisive 
historical moments, with political forces closely balanced, small 
pushes can tip events down one road that later comes to seem 
foreordained. 
Professor Heckman does not challenge my account of North 
Carolina and Alabama. But he mistakenly believes the account I 
offer stops in those states; because I discuss the dynamics of po-
litical struggle only in North Carolina and Alabama, he con-
cludes, much to my surprise, that The Canon "does not profess 
to see hope" of a similar sort elsewhere.38 Of course, one might 
think that, had disfranchisement been reversed in North Caro-
lina and Alabama, such a dramatic reversal would have left a 
mark everywhere else. But more importantly, I did not discuss 
other states at all; I had hoped to make the point without enter-
ing too deeply the fascinating but detailed bogs of 19th century 
politics in every Southern state. North Carolina and Alabama 
were meant to be only exemplary in The Canon, one a state from 
the border region, the other from the deep South and the focus 
of the Giles litigation. Professor Heckman's challenge presses 
me to say a few words about politics elsewhere. For it turns out 
that disfranchisement was so controversial in most places that 
political leaders did not even have the nerve, as in Alabama, to 
go through the pretense of taking the issue to the electorate. In 
other words, Alabama, where massive electoral fraud was essen-
tial to adopting disfranchisement, involved probably the most 
democratic process by which constitutional disfranchisement oc-
curred. 
Mississippi, the leader in disfranchisement through the 
technique of adopting a new, post-Reconstruction state constitu-
tion, held a constitutional convention composed of 130 Democ-
37. C. Vann Woodward first revealed this dynamic in Origins of the New South at 
327 (cited in note 35). Woodward went on to observe: "The real question was which 
whites should be supreme." Id. at 328. 
38. Heckman, 19 Canst. Comm. at 639 (cited in note 19). 
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rats and a sum total of four men from other parties.39 The 
movement for the convention itself was "strictly a movement by 
the elite, which did not reflect any general demand for disfran-
chisement."40 Even so, the suffrage restrictions proposed split 
delegates along white-county and black-county lines; the former 
opposed disfranchisement. At one and the same time, the new 
constitution would radically reduce the electorate, eliminate 
black voters, and transfer power among whites into the hands of 
the elite planters of the black counties. "The Mississippi press 
bitterly attacked the franchise provision as a fraud and a dis-
grace. "41 As for public opinion, thirty-four papers, all but one of 
the leading ones in the state, came out in absolute opposition to 
the new constitution.42 Before this time, the prevailing practice 
in Southern states, other than during and right after the Civil 
War, had been to submit new constitutions for popular approval. 
But when the extensive hostility to the proposed new constitu-
tion became clear, the delegates to the convention decided that 
it was "unnecessary and inexpedient" to submit the constitution 
for popular ratification. Instead, they just went ahead and pro-
claimed it to be in effect-and got away with that. 
Mississippi became, then, a model for bypassing the elector-
ate-even the white electorate-as a way of enshrining disfran-
chisement. Virginia proponents had twice tried and failed to get 
popular consent for a convention; in the most recent defeat, just 
three years before a convention was in fact called, the popular 
vote had been 83,453 against a convention and 38,326 in favor. 43 
To allay widely shared concerns, Virginia's General Assembly 
then authorized a convention and election of delegates but also 
required, in that same law, that any new constitution be submit-
ted for popular approval. In another important act, the Democ-
ratic Party, leading the charge for a convention, also committed 
to popular ratification in its electoral platform. But while the 
convention was debating ratification, the popular vote in Ala-
bama took place; as described in The Canon, the Alabama dis-
franchising constitution was rejected in the white counties and 
adopted only because it won overwhelming-and obviously 
fraudulently-majorities in the black counties. Virginia's dele-
39. J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the 
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 at 142 (Yale U. Press, 1974). 
40. ld. at 142. 
41. Van Woodward, Origins of the New South at 341 (cited in note 35). 
42. ld. 
43. J.N. Brenarnan, A History of Virginia Conventions 82 (J.L. Hill Printing Co., 
1902). 
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gates took note of the Alabama experience, and by a small ma-
jority, Virginia's elites defied both state law and the commitment 
to party members and simply, as in Mississippi, proclaimed the 
constitution law without any popular referendum. No valid Vir-
ginia constitution since 1776 had been adopted without popular 
submission and vote- but the disfranchising convention got 
away with this ploy.44 
Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina: the pattern 
of how constitutional disfranchisement was achieved should be 
clear. I will not belabor the point by going through the record in 
other disfranchising states.4 To entrench disfranchisement into 
enduring, constitutional form, the oligarchic Southern elite had 
to lie, steal votes on a massive scale, or control a disfranchising 
convention and then avoid popular ratification at all costs. The 
success of these constitutions, thus, hung by a fragile thread; far 
from inevitable, popular support did not even exist in many 
states. My point is not that most whites would have been un-
happy had black voting been eliminated; a majority surely would 
have been. But it was not easy to disfranchise blacks without 
raising the serious possibility (which became the reality) that 
many whites would be written out of politics too. The Fifteenth 
Amendment was still considered a barrier to franchise rules that 
were explicitly written along racial lines. But poll taxes would 
burden poor whites as much as poor blacks; literacy and under-
standing tests contained the risk of eliminating illiterate whites 
as well. And because disfranchisement favored the Democratic 
Party, other parties, such as Republicans, Populists, and Green-
backers, often resisted. Politics is coalition building; disfran-
44. On the history of prior Virginia constitutions and the debate over proclamation 
versus submission in 1901-02, see Paul Clipman McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional 
Convention of 1901-1902 at 113-136 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1928). This leading study 
from within a generation of the events concludes: "Although it is impossible to say con-
clusively that the constitution would have been rejected had it been submitted to the 
people, the general opinion is that it would have been .... the negro vote could have 
been handled as in the past [by fraudulently "counting it in" for the constitution], but 
that the opposition of the Republicans and the disaffected elements in the Democratic 
party could have been overcome is doubtful." Id. at 129. This study also concludes that 
the new constitution had delivered control of the state into the hands of less than 10 per-
cent of its citizens, id. at 58-and this from an author who concludes nonetheless that 
"the radical restriction of the suffrage was a necessity." ld. at 154. 
45. As a brief example from yet one more state, consider South Carolina: only 38 
percent of white voters there voted in the referendum for a disfranchising constitution, 
which passed only by 31,402 votes to 29,523 votes-despite widespread fraud designed to 
get the referendum passed. Again, in this deep South state, "the impetus for disfran-
chisement derived not from the masses, but from a fairly small elite." Kousser, Shaping 
Southern Politics at 148-49 (cited in note 39). 
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chisement affected enough interests that strong coalitions ex-
isted against it, regardless of how some members of those coali-
tions might have felt about black suffrage alone. Because dis-
franchisement constitutions were such a precarious "success" in 
so many states, had the Supreme Court in Giles invalidated the 
Alabama Constitution of 1901, it is entirely speculative how 
these battles would have come out in different years, with ever-
shifting political dynamics, in the various states. 
III 
Shifting from historical interpretation to contemporary con-
stitutional theory, Professor Heckman cautions against criticiz-
ing Giles, lest we open the door to all manner of judicial tamper-
ing with politics, including actions as surprising as Supreme 
Court resolution of a disputed Presidential election. This is the 
slipperiest slope I have seen worried about in some time: the line 
from Giles to Bush v. Gore hardly need be so precipitous. None-
theless, I do agree with the general nature of Professor 
Heckman's concern. As constitutional law has shaken off the 
legacy of Giles and come to play a major role in overseeing de-
mocratic politics in the last 40 years, the task for judges and 
scholars is to develop an acceptable theoretical framework for 
specifying the kinds of circumstances, factors, and triggering 
principles in which constitutional law should aggressively scruti-
nize the ground rules of democracy-and when constitutional 
law should leave democratic processes to self-scrutiny. Much of 
my own work in recent years has been directed to precisely these 
questions concerning a proper theoretical understanding of the 
contours a "constitutional law of democracy" ought to have.46 
Perhaps it will provide some comfort to Professor Heckman to 
learn that I have criticized the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist 
Courts for failing to conceive these boundary lines appropri-
ately. 
But a constitutional practice and theory that could not dis-
tinguish between one of the most systemic, transparent, and 
massive violations of clear constitutional principle and text in 
American history-the disfranchisement movement-and other 
46. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in a Badly 
Flawed Election (Ronald Dworkin ed. 2002); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disor-
der, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.695 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competi-
tion, 85 U. Va. L. Rev. 1605 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as 
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643 (1998). 
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contexts in which constitutional law is appealed to today to in-
validate certain democratic processes would be a constitutional 
system in pathological condition. Difficult boundary issues 
abound regarding when constitutional law should overturn po-
litical structures and when there is insufficient justification to do 
so.47 But in terms of constitutional principle, disfranchisement is 
not one of them. We can debate the essentially political and stra-
tegic judgments about whether the Court would have done more 
harm than good had it reached a contrary result in Giles. But in 
terms of constitutional principle and theory, there seems to me 
nothing at all to say, other than that disfranchisement was one of 
the baldest, most systemic violations of straightforward constitu-
tional command in American history. If constitutional law and 
judicial review do not exist to hold that the blatant, race-based 
elimination of citizens between 1890-1908 from even the formal 
right to vote violated the legal meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, it is hard to know what constitutional law exists 
for at all. 
47. This is perhaps the central theme explored throughout my casebook. See Sam-
uel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal 
Regulation of the Political Process (Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 2002). 
